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ABSTRACT 
  As judges have debated the best method of constitutional and 
statutory interpretation, scholars have begun calling for increased 
constraints on the methodological freedoms of Article III judges. This 
Note rejects such proposals on constitutional grounds. Drawing upon 
the jurisprudence and scholarship on inherent powers, I argue that 
interpretive choice is an inherent judicial power. The drafting and 
ratification history of Article III demonstrates that the Framers 
expected federal judges to interpret the law. To accomplish this task, 
however, judges must have some methodological approach to help 
them prioritize interpretive evidence. Thus, imposition of a binding 
interpretive methodology upon federal judges would pose two 
constitutional problems. First, it would infringe the essential judicial 
function of interpretive deliberation. Second, it would prevent the 
judiciary as a whole from engaging in its most powerful constitutional 
check on the excesses of the political branches. Because interpretive 
freedom is necessary to the fulfillment of the Article III judicial 
function, that freedom must be considered an inherent power vested 
in all federal judges. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Though ostensibly the weakest branch, the federal judiciary is 
only growing in importance as the expositor of federal law. The 
expansion of modern regulatory programs, in particular, has 
generated an increasing number of questions of statutory 
interpretation for federal judges1 to answer. Judicial review of such 
statutes traces its roots back to Chief Justice Marshall’s famous 
statement in Marbury v. Madison2 that “[i]t is emphatically the 
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”3 
To “say what the law is,” judges rely on a number of interpretive 
tools, including not only the text, legislative history, and purpose of a 
statute, but also canons of construction and even the consequences of 
their decisions.4 To guide their use of these tools, many judges have 
adopted personal philosophies of interpretation that privilege some 
tools at the expense of others.5 The ensuing debate has found its way 
into case law, scholarly literature, and the mainstream media. 
Despite popular trust in the judiciary,6 a growing number of 
scholars have begun advocating limits on the methodological freedom 
of federal judges engaged in constitutional and statutory 
interpretation.7 The proposals vary, but they share the common goal 
of preventing arguments among federal judges about the best or most 
appropriate method of interpretation and, at the same time, 
 
 1. I use “federal judges” interchangeably with “Article III judges” throughout this Note. 
Because non-Article III judges are of questionable constitutional stature, none of the opinions I 
express in this piece should be construed to apply to them. 
 2. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
 3. Id. at 177. 
 4. See infra Part I.A. 
 5. See infra Part I.A. 
 6. Polls repeatedly show public confidence in the judiciary far surpassing trust in the 
president and Congress. According to one Gallup poll, the judicial branch has steadily 
outstripped the other two branches in Americans’ trust and confidence since 1974. Frank 
Newport, Trust in Legislative Branch Falls to Record-Low 36%, GALLUP (Sept. 24, 2010), http://
www.gallup.com/poll/143225/Trust-Legislative-Branch-Falls-Record-Low.aspx. 
 7. See, e.g., Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: 
Methodological Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 1750, 1856 (2010) 
(“[T]he search may be for a theory of the ‘second best.’ This is important because it shifts the 
inquiry away from the idea that there is a single ‘ideal’ way to ascertain the meaning of a 
statute—a question much more likely to divide judges and scholars—to, instead, the question of 
whether there is a sufficiently satisfying theoretical compromise that will also enhance 
coordination and stability in a complex and (for lower courts) overworked legal system.” 
(footnote omitted) (citing Frederick Schauer, Statutory Construction and the Coordinating 
Function of Plain Meaning, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 231, 232)). 
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increasing predictability for litigants and legislators. Although greater 
uniformity and predictability in the system offer rule-of-law benefits, 
the Constitution imposes structural barriers to achieving that 
predictability. One such barrier is the division of powers, which vests 
some powers exclusively in particular branches. If an action intended 
to bring uniformity of interpretation trespasses on the judiciary’s core 
inherent powers, it cannot stand—no matter how well intentioned the 
actor may have been. Whether one styles these powers as inherent, 
essential, or necessary, they exist to preserve the tripartite system of 
government that the Framers established.8 
This Note argues that binding frameworks of interpretation are 
inconsistent with the essence of the Article III judicial function and 
with judicial independence. My analysis proceeds in three Parts. Part 
I provides background information on the scholarship surrounding 
interpretive methodologies and the inherent powers of the judiciary. 
Part II offers historical evidence that the Framers intended Article III 
judges to be independent interpreters of the Constitution and federal 
statutes. Part III ties the prior two Parts together by arguing that 
every federal judge enjoys a reasonable zone of inherent power to 
choose a method of interpretation. This power is a function of both 
the federal judge’s task of interpretation and the judiciary’s role as an 
independent check on the political branches. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
Scholarship on the “judicial Power”9 is broad and diverse, as 
scholars have attempted to derive meaning from the ambiguous text 
of Article III.10 Rather than tread too far afield from the aim of this 
Note, this Part focuses on the literature regarding inherent judicial 
power and interpretive methodologies. Although these areas of 
scholarship have developed independently of each other, I believe 
they ought to be considered in tandem. Section A discusses the 
debate over methods of interpretation and some reactionary 
 
 8. See Joseph J. Anclien, Broader Is Better: The Inherent Powers of Federal Courts, 64 
N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 37, 74 (2009) (“A key feature of our Constitution’s separation of 
powers is that ‘a branch [may] not impair another in the performance of its constitutional 
duties.’ Hence, Congress may not behave in a manner that seriously impairs courts’ abilities to 
exercise the judicial power, and to exercise that power effectively.” (alteration in original) 
(footnote omitted) (quoting Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 757 (1996))). 
 9. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
 10. Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article III: Separating the Two Tiers of 
Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. REV. 205, 205–06 (1985). 
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proposals to limit the power of federal judges to engage in that 
debate. Section B considers the scope of inherent judicial power, 
which consists of those powers incidental to or necessary for the 
discharge of the judiciary’s constitutional duties.11 Bridging the gap 
between these two bodies of work, this Note argues that federal 
judges have inherent power to develop and implement their own 
reasonable philosophies of interpretation. 
A. Interpretive Methodologies 
Methods of interpretation12 are a hot topic in legal scholarship, 
spurring even Supreme Court Justices to weigh in on the correct way 
to interpret a statutory or constitutional text.13 Though major cases of 
constitutional or statutory interpretation account for only a small 
portion of the federal judiciary’s workload, they offer some of the 
most substantively interesting challenges. Even after hundreds of 
years of jurisprudence, judges face open questions about the scope of 
rights protected in the Constitution and the proper balance of power 
between the federal government and the states. The United States’ 
common-law system requires judges to decide these important 
questions through case-by-case analysis. Methodology matters. This 
Section provides a brief outline of the modern debate over 
methodology and then introduces the scholarship that seeks to bind 
judges in methodological choice. 
1. The Methodological Debate.  Legal scholarship proffers many 
interpretive methods, but the modern debate is framed by the 
dialogue between Supreme Court Justices Scalia and Breyer. In 
several books,14 essays,15 and debates,16 these Justices have advocated 
 
 11. 16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 264 (2010). 
 12. Throughout this Note, I use “methods of interpretation” or “interpretive 
methodologies” to refer to broader theories of interpretation such as textualism, originalism, or 
purposivism, rather than the methodological tests applied to specific legal issues like First 
Amendment challenges. 
 13. See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY 7–8 (2005) (articulating six factors upon 
which he and other judges may rely in answering questions of interpretation—text, history, 
tradition, precedent, purposes or values, and consequences); ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF 
INTERPRETATION 23 (1997) (arguing that judges should look only to a reasonable interpretation 
of the text). 
 14. BREYER, supra note 13; STEPHEN BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK (2010); 
SCALIA, supra note 13. 
 15. E.g., Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 845, 848 (1992); Stephen Breyer, Our Democratic Constitution, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
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divergent approaches to the task of judging. Justice Scalia suggests a 
textualist approach with limited interpretive tools,17 whereas Justice 
Breyer proposes a more fluid, purposivist method.18 This Subsection 
describes the methods of these Justices in detail and then briefly 
discusses some of the other methodological options. 
Justice Scalia is perhaps the most well-known advocate of 
textualism. In his influential essay, A Matter of Interpretation, Justice 
Scalia writes, “A text should not be construed strictly, and it should 
not be construed leniently; it should be construed reasonably, to 
contain all that it fairly means.”19 Yet this statement alone does not 
separate him from his purposivist colleagues, who also acknowledge 
being constrained by text. Rather, what separates him from the 
purposivists is his focus on the original understanding of a text20 to the 
exclusion of other evidence of its meaning. He is particularly averse 
to the use of legislative history, not only because he believes it is an 
unreliable measure of congressional intent,21 but also because he 
fundamentally rejects the entire project of seeking legislative intent.22 
To Justice Scalia, only the words of a statute have gone through the 
legislative process, and thus only the words are law.23 Recognizing 
that ambiguity might nevertheless exist on the face of a statute, 
Justice Scalia must use some tools of interpretation. Thus, he often 
 
245, 246 (2002); Stephen G. Breyer, Reflections on the Role of Appellate Courts: A View from 
the Supreme Court, 8 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 91, 99 (2006); Antonin Scalia, Keynote Address, 
Foreign Legal Authority in the Federal Courts, 98 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 305, 307 (2004); 
Antonin Scalia, Essay, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 854 (1989). 
 16. E.g., Justices Breyer and Scalia Converse on the Constitution, AM. CONSTITUTION 
SOC’Y (Dec. 6, 2006), http://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/justices-breyer-and-scalia-converse-on-the-
constitution; Transcript of Discussion Between U.S. Supreme Court Justices Antonin Scalia and 
Stephen Breyer—AU Washington College of Law, Jan. 13, AU NEWS (Jan. 14, 2005), http://
domino.american.edu/AU/media/mediarel.nsf/1D265343BDC2189785256B810071F238/1F2F7
DC4757FD01E85256F890068E6E0. 
 17. SCALIA, supra note 13, at 23. 
 18. BREYER, supra note 13, at 85. 
 19. SCALIA, supra note 13, at 23. 
 20. Id. at 38. 
 21. See id. at 31–32 (“What is most exasperating about the use of legislative history, 
however, is that it does not even make sense for those who accept legislative intent as the 
criterion. It is much more likely to produce a false or contrived legislative intent than a genuine 
one. The first and most obvious reason for this is that, with respect to 99.99 percent of the issues 
of construction reaching the courts, there is no legislative intent, so that any clues provided by 
the legislative history are bound to be false.”). 
 22. Id. at 31. 
 23. Id. at 30. 
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turns to dictionaries,24 canons of interpretation,25 and history26 in his 
analysis. He states, “In textual interpretation, context is everything, 
and the context of the Constitution tells us not to expect nit-picking 
detail, and to give words and phrases an expansive rather than narrow 
interpretation—though not an interpretation that the language will 
not bear.”27 
Justice Breyer approaches interpretation from a very different 
vantage point. Although he recognizes the importance of the text, he 
also unabashedly embraces a broader role for the interpreting judge.28 
If the text would lead a court away from the established purpose of 
the law, Justice Breyer would expect a judge to reject the literal 
meaning of the words.29 He explains, 
[J]udicial use of the ‘will of the reasonable legislator’—even if at 
times it is a fiction—helps statutes match their means to their overall 
public policy objectives, a match that helps translate the popular will 
into sound policy. An overly literal reading of a text can too often 
stand in the way.30 
To effectuate the will of the legislature, Justice Breyer endorses a set 
of six interpretive tools including text, history, tradition, precedent, 
purposes, and consequences.31 He quotes Justice Frankfurter,32 who 
 
 24. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2791 (2008) (using dictionaries to 
determine the meaning of “keep and bear Arms” in the Second Amendment). 
 25. See SCALIA, supra note 13, at 26 (“All of this is so commonsensical that, were the 
canons not couched in Latin, you would find it hard to believe anyone could criticize them.”). 
 26. See Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2801 (invoking history to support the conclusion that the 
prefatory clause of the Second Amendment does not limit the operative clause to militia 
matters). 
 27. SCALIA, supra note 13, at 37. 
 28. See BREYER, supra note 13, at 109–10 (“The discussion has suggested that I, a judge 
who has a role in playing the complex score provided me in the form of constitutional and 
statutory text, history, structure, and precedent, can perform my role with less discord, more 
faithfully to the entire enterprise, and with stronger justification for the power I wield in a 
government that is of, by, and for the people, by paying close attention to the Constitution’s 
democratic active liberty objective.”). 
 29. See id. at 85 (“The fifth example . . . . shows how overemphasis on text can lead courts 
astray, divorcing law from life—indeed, creating law that harms those whom Congress meant to 
help. And it explains why a purposive approach is more consistent with the framework for a 
‘delegated democracy’ that the Constitution creates.” (quoting Ahron Barak, Foreword, A 
Judge on Judging: The Role of a Supreme Court in a Democracy, 116 HARV. L. REV. 16, 28–29 
(2002))). 
 30. Id. at 101. 
 31. Id. at 7–8. 
 32. Id. at 18. 
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states, “If the purpose of construction is the ascertainment of 
meaning, nothing that is logically relevant should be excluded.”33 
Thus, Justice Breyer’s strain of purposivism focuses on understanding 
the law in relation to both the people who passed it and the people 
who must live with it. 
Although textualism and purposivism loosely represent the 
major positions in the methodological debate, judicial philosophies 
vary considerably within these groups. Some textualists adhere to a 
strict constructionist approach, whereas others focus on a more 
history-driven originalist methodology.34 Some purposivists may 
weigh the tools advanced by Justice Breyer differently, focusing more 
on legislative history or on their own evaluations of consequences.35 
For the purposes of this Note, however, one need only understand the 
broad strokes of the textualist-purposivist debate that is playing out in 
legal scholarship, in Supreme Court cases, and on the political stage. 
2. The Desire To Bind Judges.  As the debate over interpretive 
methodology has continued, some scholars have called for greater 
constraints on judges.36 This call may reflect a growing understanding 
that methodology can be outcome determinative on important 
questions of law. Justices Scalia and Breyer, for example, are known 
 
 33. Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527, 
541 (1947). 
 34. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Textualism, the Unknown Ideal?, 96 MICH L. REV. 1509, 
1516 (1998) (“Scalia’s position on constitutional interpretation—which rejects an evolving, au 
courant Constitution in favor of an originalist, stagnant one—is subtly and perhaps just 
tentatively different from his position on statutory interpretation. If the former seeks out the 
original meaning of the text, the latter says, with Holmes, ‘I don’t care what [the legislature’s] 
intention was. I only want to know what the words mean.’ The former suggests a relatively more 
historicist inquiry, the latter a relatively more linguistic one.” (alteration in original) (footnote 
omitted) (citation omitted) (quoting SCALIA, supra note 13, at 22–23)). 
 35. Justices Ginsburg and Breyer, for example, would generally be considered purposivists. 
Adrian Vermeule, The Cycles of Statutory Interpretation, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 149, 186 (2001). But 
they actually have meaningful differences in jurisprudence. See Saby Ghoshray, To Understand 
Foreign Court Citation, 69 ALB. L. REV. 709, 728 (2006) (“[J]urisprudence empowered by 
comparative dialogue, emboldened by sharing and learning from across the globe, is the very 
basis of Justice Ginsburg’s constitutional interpretation . . . .”); id. at 741 (“Justice Breyer’s 
jurisprudence sits at the confluence of contrasting intellectual and philosophical 
developments. . . . But, in the end, it is firmly anchored in pragmatic consequentialism, which 
will continue to be the hallmark of his jurisprudence.”). 
 36. See, e.g., Donald L. Beschle, Uniformity in Constitutional Interpretation and the 
Background Right to Effective Democratic Governance, 63 IND. L.J. 539, 542 (1988) (“It is this 
background right to an effective democracy within constitutional limits, the explicit recognition 
of which would have a significant effect on constitutional interpretation as a whole, which 
provides the foundation for the value of uniformity in constitutional interpretation.”). 
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for reaching opposite conclusions on many of the most important 
constitutional issues that have been presented during their time 
together on the Court.37 Similarly, the ninety-four district courts and 
twelve circuit courts routinely produce conflicting decisions. 
Professors Henry M. Hart Jr. and Albert M. Sacks crystallize the 
problem, noting that “[t]he hard truth of the matter is that American 
courts have no intelligible, generally accepted, and consistently 
applied theory of statutory interpretation.”38 Justices can argue over 
interpretation, but there appears to be very little conversion going on 
at the Supreme Court. 
Scholars have responded to this challenge with different 
proposals to establish one methodological framework for 
interpretation in the federal courts.39 This solution would not 
guarantee uniformity of interpretation in all cases, but it might 
improve consistency and predictability in the system as a whole. 
Professor Sydney Foster argues that this outcome could be achieved 
by applying an “extra-strong” version of stare decisis to doctrines of 
statutory interpretation adopted by the courts.40 Foster builds her 
argument by analogizing methods of interpretation to choice-of-law 
rules.41 Some federal courts have held that when interpreting state 
 
 37. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008) (disagreeing over the 
extent to which the Second Amendment protects an individual right to bear arms); Giles v. 
California, 128 S. Ct. 2678 (2008) (reaching opposite conclusions as to whether a defendant 
forfeits his Sixth Amendment right to confront a witness against him when his own actions made 
the witness unavailable to testify at trial); Indiana v. Edwards, 128 S. Ct. 2379 (2008) (disputing 
whether a state violates the Constitution by refusing a criminal defendant’s request to represent 
himself on the ground that he suffered from a mental illness, even though he was found 
otherwise competent to stand trial); Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006) (arriving at 
different conclusions on whether the Fourth Amendment requires the exclusion of evidence 
obtained in violation of the knock-and-announce rule). These citations reflect only those cases 
in which Justices Scalia and Breyer filed opposing opinions. They joined opposing opinions in 
many other cases, but their own opinions demonstrate most clearly their dueling doctrines. 
 38. HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS 
IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1169 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey 
eds., 1994). 
 39. See, e.g., Tara Leigh Grove, The Structural Case for Vertical Maximalism, 95 CORNELL 
L. REV. 1, 4 (2010) (“The Court must therefore make the most of the cases it does hear by 
issuing broad (maximal) decisions that guide the lower courts in the many cases that it lacks the 
capacity to review.”); Gary E. O’Connor, Restatement (First) of Statutory Interpretation, 7 
N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 333, 334 (2004) (arguing that a Restatement of Statutory 
Interpretation would provide helpful guidelines for judges confronted with interpretive 
questions, much like the Restatement of Contracts has done for judges interpreting contracts). 
 40. Sydney Foster, Should Courts Give Stare Decisis Effect to Statutory Interpretation 
Methodology?, 96 GEO. L.J. 1863, 1870 (2008). 
 41. Id. at 1884. 
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statutes pursuant to the Rules of Decision Act42 and Erie Railroad Co. 
v. Tompkins,43 those courts must follow state methods of 
interpretation.44 The rationales for this move, Foster argues, also 
support giving stare decisis effect to methods of interpretation in the 
federal courts.45 She suggests that this practice would increase 
uniformity in the federal system, force judges to take greater care in 
selecting methodology, and make it more difficult for judges to be 
driven by substantive-law preferences.46 
Professor Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz takes a different tack—
suggesting that Congress should establish a set of federal rules for 
statutory interpretation as a public-policy matter.47 Before offering 
this proposal, however, Rosenkranz engages the question whether 
particular methods of interpretation may be constitutionally required. 
He summarily dismisses the argument of this Note that interpretive 
freedom may be an inherent judicial power by stating, “whatever 
judicial power exists over interpretive methodology must be common 
lawmaking power, which may be trumped by Congress.”48 But 
Rosenkranz misconceptualizes interpretive methodology. It is not 
common lawmaking, particularly because it has no stare decisis 
effect—one of the hallmarks of a working common-law system. 
Rather, interpretive methodology is a judge’s method of prioritizing 
evidence to come to a decision about the meaning of a statute. This 
approach is, I argue, the very essence of what it means to be a judge.49 
Professor Abbe R. Gluck goes one step further than Rosenkranz, 
looking to the states as laboratories of experimentation to determine 
 
 42. Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2006). 
 43. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
 44. Foster, supra note 40, at 1884–85. As Professor Foster herself notes, however, the 
Supreme Court precedent on this issue is mixed, id. at 1884 n.119, and Professor Abbe R. Gluck 
treats this principle as an open question of law, see infra Section III.A. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 1907–10. 
 47. Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 HARV. L. 
REV. 2085, 2090 (2002). 
 48. Id. at 2103. 
 49. Professor Linda Jellum also disagrees with Professor Rosenkranz, offering a similar 
argument to the one advanced in this Note. In a brief discussion, she suggests that general 
“interpretive directives” are likely to impose an unconstitutional burden on the judiciary’s 
deliberative process but that specific directives may be less problematic. Linda Jellum, “Which 
Is To Be Master,” the Judiciary or the Legislature? When Statutory Directives Violate Separation 
of Powers, 56 UCLA L. REV. 837, 895 (2009). This Note significantly expands that analysis. 
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the workability of such proposals.50 Perhaps most interesting is her 
Oregon case study, which she calls an “unparalleled example of a 
judicially imposed, consistently applied interpretive regime for 
statutory cases that remained in place unaltered for a sixteen-year 
period.”51 In a unanimous opinion in Portland General Electric Co. v. 
Bureau of Labor and Industries (PGE),52 the Oregon Supreme Court 
imposed a three-step methodology for all questions of interpretation 
and then proceeded to follow it strictly for the next sixteen years.53 
The case set up three tiers of approved sources: first, courts could 
look to the text to solve an ambiguity; second, “[i]f, but only if,” the 
text failed to provide an answer, courts could look to legislative 
history; and third, “[i]f after consideration of text, context, and 
legislative history,” the legislative intent is unclear, a court could use 
general maxims of statutory construction.54 Several studies indicate 
that this methodology successfully curtailed the use of legislative 
history, as courts resolved almost all statutory issues on a textual 
basis.55 It also brought more cohesion to the Oregon Supreme Court; 
between January 2005 and May 2009, fifty-three of the fifty-nine 
interpretation cases decided by the court were decided unanimously.56 
Although Oregon seemed to have done the impossible—
seamlessly transition to one coherent system of interpretation for the 
state—the Oregon Supreme Court’s efforts did not last. In 2001, eight 
years after PGE, the state legislature took steps to bring legislative 
history into the first step of the PGE framework.57 The supreme 
court, however, ignored the statute and continued to apply PGE for 
another eight years.58 Finally, in State v. Gaines,59 the court requested 
briefing on the framework.60 The court ultimately produced a 
 
 50. Gluck, supra note 7, at 1756. Her five major case studies were Oregon, Texas, 
Connecticut, Wisconsin, and Michigan. Id. 
 51. Id. at 1776. 
 52. Portland Gen. Elec. Co. v. Bureau of Labor & Indus., 859 P.2d 1143 (Or. 1993). 
 53. Gluck, supra note 7, at 1775. 
 54. Id. at 1777 (emphasis omitted). 
 55. From 1993 to 1998, the Court looked at 137 statutory-interpretation cases, reaching 
legislative history thirty-three times and substantive canons only eleven times. Id. at 1779. From 
1999 to 2006, the court applied the statutory-interpretation framework 150 times, reaching 
legislative history nine times and never reaching the canons of construction. Id. 
 56. Id. at 1780–81. 
 57. Id. at 1783. 
 58. Id. 
 59. State v. Gaines, 206 P.3d 1042 (Or. 2009). 
 60. Gluck, supra note 7, at 1784. 
BANDY IN PRINTER PROOF 11/21/2011  12:38 PM 
2011] INTERPRETIVE FREEDOM 661 
confusing opinion suggesting that legislative history might have a 
greater role to play in future interpretive decisions.61 Thus, what was 
nearly a tremendous success for a judicially imposed state interpretive 
framework displayed its weakness: a need for constant reaffirmation 
by the highest court, especially in the face of legislative pressure or 
changes in the court’s personnel. 
Texas and Connecticut were even less successful in their 
attempts at establishing a reliable method of interpretation. Both 
states experienced discord between the legislature and the judiciary 
over which branch should control methods of interpretation. In 
Texas, the legislature passed an act specifically authorizing state 
courts to use traditionally purposivist tools—legislative history, 
consequences, and objectives.62 Yet the Texas Court of Criminal 
Appeals actively defied this legislative decision, implementing a rule 
prohibiting courts from resorting to tools beyond the text unless the 
text proved insufficient to resolve the ambiguity.63 The Texas 
Supreme Court has also declined to follow the act when the text is 
unambiguous.64 In Connecticut, the state supreme court banned plain-
meaning methodology, prompting the legislature to pass a bill 
expressly requiring its use.65 Like the high courts in Texas, however, 
 
 61. Id. 
 62. See Code Construction Act, TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 311.023 (West 2005) (noting 
that courts, when engaged in statutory interpretation, may look to extrinsic factors like purpose, 
consequences, and legislative history even when the statute’s language is unambiguous). 
 63. See, e.g., Boykin v. State, 818 S.W.2d 782, 785–86 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (“If the plain 
language of a statute would lead to absurd results, or if the language is not plain but rather 
ambiguous, then and only then, out of absolute necessity, is it constitutionally permissible for a 
court to consider, in arriving at a sensible interpretation, such extratextual factors as executive 
or administrative interpretations of the statute or legislative history. This method of statutory 
interpretation is of ancient origin and is, in fact, the only method that does not unnecessarily 
invade the lawmaking province of the Legislature. The courts of this and other jurisdictions, as 
well as many commentators, have long recognized and accepted this method as constitutionally 
and logically compelled.” (footnote omitted)); id. at 786 n.4 (“Although Section 311.023 of the 
Texas Government Code invites, but does not require, courts to consider extratextual factors 
when the statutes in question are not ambiguous, such an invitation should be declined for the 
reasons stated in the body of this opinion.”). 
 64. See, e.g., Alex Sheshunoff Mgmt. Servs. v. Johnson, 209 S.W.3d 644, 652 n.4 (Tex. 2006) 
(“[W]hile the Code Construction Act expressly authorizes courts to use a range of construction 
aids, including legislative history we are mindful that over-reliance on secondary materials 
should be avoided, particularly where a statute’s language is clear. If the text is unambiguous, 
we must take the Legislature at its word and not rummage around in legislative minutiae.” 
(citation omitted)). 
 65. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1-2z (2003) (“The meaning of a statute shall, in the first instance, 
be ascertained from the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after 
examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and 
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the Connecticut Supreme Court has continued to treat its precedent 
as binding and has interpreted the statute loosely, enabling the court 
to consult extratextual sources.66 The courts in these states were 
unwilling to suffer legislative interference with their interpretive 
role.67 
Additionally, the supreme courts of Wisconsin and Michigan 
have introduced interpretive revolutions. In Wisconsin, the court 
created a textualist framework—not unlike the one established in 
Oregon—to which the state’s purposivist justices have acquiesced and 
which lower courts have treated as binding precedent.68 Although 
judges have occasionally disputed whether the framework should 
apply, the high court led the way to a more consistent interpretive 
approach.69 In Michigan, the governor appointed four explicitly 
textualist justices to a seven-member court.70 The new majority began 
establishing a textualist framework in a series of decisions that have 
 
unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the 
meaning of the statute shall not be considered.”). 
 66. See, e.g., Bell Atl. Nynex Mobile, Inc. v. Comm’r of Revenue Servs., 869 A.2d 611, 617–
18 & n.13 (Conn. 2005) (“[W]e begin with a searching examination of the language of the 
statute, because that is the most important factor to be considered. In doing so, we attempt to 
determine its range of plausible meanings and, if possible, narrow that range to those that 
appear most plausible. We do not, however, end with the language. We recognize, further, that 
the purpose or purposes of the legislation, and the context of the language, broadly understood, 
are directly relevant to the meaning of the language of the statute.”). 
 67. See, e.g., Boykin, 818 S.W.2d at 786 n.4 (“[I]nterpretation statutes that ‘seek[] to control 
the attitude or the subjective thoughts of the judiciary’ violate the separation of powers 
doctrine.” (second alteration in original) (quoting James C. Thomas, Statutory Construction 
When Legislation Is Viewed as a Legal Institution, 3 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 191, 211 n.85 (1966))); 
see also Gluck, supra note 7, at 1796–97 (“Indeed, because the court rarely deems that section 1-
2z applies, it has been able to avoid, for the full six years since its enactment, the question 
whether the statute unconstitutionally infringes on judicial authority, despite various hints in 
dicta that it might.”). 
 68. Gluck, supra note 7, at 1800–02; see also State v. Doss, 754 N.W.2d 150, 158 (Wis. 2008) 
(“[Q]uestions of statutory interpretation . . . are reviewed de novo under the standards set forth 
by [State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court, 681 N.W.2d 110 (Wis. 2004)].”); Kalal, 681 N.W.2d at 125 
(“What is clear, however, is that Wisconsin courts ordinarily do not consult extrinsic sources of 
statutory interpretation unless the language of the statute is ambiguous. By ‘extrinsic sources’ 
we mean interpretive resources outside the statutory text—typically items of legislative 
history.”). 
 69. Gluck, supra note 7, at 1802; see also Lornson v. Siddiqui, 735 N.W.2d 55, 76 (Wis. 
2007) (Crooks, J., concurring) (disagreeing with the majority’s determination that the statute 
was ambiguous and thus subject to extrinsic evidence of its meaning under Kalal). 
 70. Gluck, supra note 7, at 1803–04. 
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been treated as precedential,71 but the project’s political aura may 
prove to weaken its stature in the long term.72 
Relying on the general willingness of states to consider the 
possibility that judges can bind other judges’ methodologies,73 
Professor Gluck suggests that these experiences provide valuable 
lessons for the federal system.74 She emphasizes the benefits of 
increased uniformity75 and a sense that judges are “act[ing] like 
judges.”76 This comment raises the question, however, of what it 
means to act as a judge in the federal system. The next Section 
explores one answer to this question through the doctrine of inherent 
powers. 
B. Inherent Powers 
The Supreme Court has recognized, at least in dicta, that each 
branch of the U.S. government possesses some inherent powers.77 The 
judiciary’s inherent power has been defined as “[a]ll powers, even 
 
 71. Id. at 1807; see also, e.g., In re Consumers Energy Co., 761 N.W.2d 346, 349 (Mich. Ct. 
App. 2008) (citing the Michigan Supreme Court’s decision in In re Complaint of Rovas Against 
SBC Michigan, 754 N.W.2d 259 (2008), which rejected application of the Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. 
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), framework in state administrative 
decisions). 
 72. Gluck, supra note 7, at 1808–09. 
 73. Id. at 1823. 
 74. Id. at 1848. 
 75. See id. at 1818 (“But why stop at Chevron? The same need for federal law uniformity in 
a world of limited Supreme Court review exists with respect to all statutory questions, not just 
statutory questions in which there is an administrative agency involved.”). 
 76. Id. at 1854. 
 77. See, e.g., Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 414 (2003) (“Although the source 
of the President’s power to act in foreign affairs does not enjoy any textual detail, the historical 
gloss on the ‘executive Power’ vested in Article II of the Constitution has recognized the 
President’s ‘vast share of responsibility for the conduct of our foreign relations.’ While Congress 
holds express authority to regulate public and private dealings with other nations in its war and 
foreign commerce powers, in foreign affairs the President has a degree of independent authority 
to act.” (citation omitted) (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610 
(1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)); Marshall v. Gordon, 243 U.S. 521, 542 (1917) (“Without 
undertaking to inclusively mention the subjects embraced in the implied power, we think from 
the very nature of that power it is clear that it . . . rests only upon the right of self-preservation, 
that is, the right to prevent acts which in and of themselves inherently obstruct or prevent the 
discharge of legislative duty or the refusal to do that which there is an inherent legislative power 
to compel in order that legislative functions may be performed.”); Ex Parte United States, 242 
U.S. 27, 41–42 (1916) (“Indisputably under our constitutional system the right to try offences 
against the criminal laws and upon conviction to impose the punishment provided by law is 
judicial, and it is equally to be conceded that in exerting the powers vested in them on such 
subject, courts inherently possess ample right to exercise reasonable, that is, judicial, discretion 
to enable them to wisely exert their authority.”). 
BANDY IN PRINTER PROOF 11/21/2011  12:38 PM 
664 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 61:651 
though not judicial in their nature, which are incident to the discharge 
by the courts of their judicial functions.”78 Professor Joseph Anclien, 
however, argues that the judiciary’s inherent powers are significantly 
broader—encompassing not only those that are necessary to the 
exercise of the judicial power, but also all those that possess a 
“natural relation” to it.79 
This Section loosely groups the recognized inherent judicial 
powers into three categories.80 First, courts have the inherent power 
to control their dockets, complete general housekeeping tasks, and 
perform a wide range of procedural matters during trial.81 Second, the 
Supreme Court relies on its inherent authority as the head of the 
Article III judicial hierarchy to impose procedural rules on the lower 
federal courts.82 Third, federal courts have broad discretion to craft 
equitable remedies, a discretion that derives from their constitutional 
and common-law equity jurisdiction, as well as from their inherent 
power.83 Although these are the major categories of inherent powers 
that have been officially invoked by the courts, they do not 
necessarily present an exhaustive list.84 
1. Control over Procedure Within a Judge’s Own Courtroom.  
The first category of recognized inherent power is the authority to 
control the day-to-day procedural aspects of one’s courtroom. Judges 
exercise this power when they set their dockets, manage parties, 
control discovery requests, and even when they stay proceedings. As 
 
 78. 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 305 (2005). 
 79. Anclien, supra note 8, at 42. 
 80. Some scholars have identified alternate groupings. See, e.g., Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The 
Inherent Powers of Federal Courts and the Structural Constitution, 86 IOWA L. REV. 735, 760 
(2001) (“Instead of considering inherent authority generally and its relationship to structural 
constitutional principles, the Court has examined the exercise of inherent power involved in 
each case—usually one aspect of judicial administration, sanctions, or the supervision of 
criminal justice.” (footnote omitted)). 
 81. Anclien, supra note 8, at 44–48. 
 82. Frazier v. Heebe, 482 U.S. 641, 645 (1987) (“This Court may exercise its inherent 
supervisory power to ensure that these local rules are consistent with ‘the principles of right and 
justice.’” (quoting In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 554 (1968) (White, J., concurring)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
 83. See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 46 (1991) (“The imposition of sanctions in 
this instance transcends a court’s equitable power concerning relations between the parties and 
reaches a court’s inherent power to police itself, thus serving the dual purpose of ‘vindicat[ing] 
judicial authority without resort to the more drastic sanctions available for contempt of court 
and mak[ing] the prevailing party whole for expenses caused by his opponent’s obstinacy.’” 
(alterations in original) (quoting Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 689 n.14 (1977))). 
 84. See infra Part II. 
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the Supreme Court has acknowledged, “[T]he power to stay 
proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every court to 
control the disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of 
time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants.”85 Professor 
Anclien summarizes a number of cases in which courts have invoked 
these powers, including the power to consolidate cases, set the 
calendar, dismiss an action under forum non conveniens, and 
promote settlement by requiring that parties have someone 
authorized to settle the case at every pretrial conference.86 Judges also 
exercise authority over evidentiary issues when they set the number 
of expert witnesses who may testify, control the admission of exhibits, 
decide whether to accept post-trial depositions, and use discovery 
procedures in habeas cases.87 As even this brief list demonstrates, 
courts invoke their inherent authority to cover a wide range of day-
to-day decisions made in the process of judging. 
This category of power rests on the necessity rationale first 
enunciated in United States v. Hudson & Goodwin.88 There, the Court 
said, 
  Certain implied powers must necessarily result to our Courts of 
justice from the nature of their institution. . . . To fine for 
contempt—imprison for contumacy—inforce the observance of 
order, &c. are powers which cannot be dispensed with in a Court, 
because they are necessary to the exercise of all others . . . .89 
In presiding over a courtroom, judges must make many decisions 
without guidance from a binding statute. They are expected to 
manage not only their dockets, but also the parties and actions before 
them. The principle is so well established that courts do not even 
need to explicitly invoke their inherent power to take these actions, 
though many do.90 
 
 85. Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936). 
 86. Anclien, supra note 8, at 44–45. 
 87. Id. at 46–47. 
 88. United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812). 
 89. Id. 
 90. See Marinechance Shipping v. Sebastian, 143 F.3d 216, 218 (5th Cir. 1998) (“The district 
court possesses the inherent power to control its docket. This power includes the authority to 
decide the order in which to hear and decide pending issues.” (citations omitted)); In re Air 
Crash Disaster at Fla. Everglades on Dec. 29, 1972, 549 F.2d 1006, 1012 (5th Cir. 1977) (“‘[T]he 
traditional exercise of the court’s inherent powers over the administration and supervision of its 
own business’ . . . . is not merely desirable. It is a critical necessity. The demands upon the 
federal courts are at least heavy, at most crushing.” (quoting MacAlister v. Guterma, 263 F.2d 
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Unsurprisingly, these limited powers have generated little 
scholarly comment beyond the recognition that they serve valuable 
functions in the judicial system. Professor Robert Pushaw, for 
example, calls them “implied indispensable powers” because courts 
need them to function competently.91 He argues that these powers are 
so central to the judicial process that the Constitution permits only 
legislation that would facilitate the exercise of these powers.92 
Similarly, Professor William Van Alstyne expresses concern about 
the expansion of judicial authority, but he acknowledges a “core of 
powers that are indispensable . . . to the performance of [judges’] 
express duties under [Article III] of the Constitution.”93 
2. Supervisory Authority.  A more controversial zone of inherent 
powers is the Supreme Court’s supervisory authority over lower court 
procedure. The Court first claimed the power to review inferior court 
procedure in 1943, stating that “[j]udicial supervision of the 
administration of criminal justice in the federal courts implies the 
duty of establishing and maintaining civilized standards of procedure 
and evidence.”94 Since that time, the Court has varied its definition of 
this power. As the Court framed it in Frazier v. Heebe,95 “This Court 
may exercise its inherent supervisory power to ensure that these local 
rules are consistent with ‘the principles of right and justice.’”96 In 
Dickerson v. United States,97 however, the Court moved beyond mere 
oversight of local rules, using its supervisory authority to justify the 
creation of binding rules of evidence and procedure for lower federal 
courts.98 
 
65, 69 (2d Cir. 1958))); MacAlister, 263 F.2d at 68 (“But even if the rule were more restricted in 
its scope we would be most reluctant to deny such inherent power to the district courts. The 
power to order consolidation prior to trial falls within the broad inherent authority of every 
court . . . .”). 
 91. Pushaw, supra note 80, at 847. 
 92. Id. at 742. 
 93. William W. Van Alstyne, The Role of Congress in Determining Incidental Powers of the 
President and of the Federal Courts: A Comment on the Horizontal Effect of the Sweeping 
Clause, 40 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 102, 107 (1976). 
 94. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 340 (1942). 
 95. Frazier v. Heebe, 482 U.S. 641 (1986). 
 96. Id. at 645 (quoting In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 554 (1968) (White, J., concurring)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 97. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000). 
 98. Id. at 437. 
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The major justification for supervisory authority rests on the 
Supreme Court’s position in the judicial hierarchy. In a compromise 
at the Constitutional Convention, Article III established one 
“supreme” court and left the creation of future “inferior” courts to 
the discretion of Congress.99 The Constitution does not describe this 
division further, but the Supreme Court has developed into a 
powerful and prestigious body that serves as the final arbiter of 
federal law. 
Although the Supreme Court has been vague about the 
justification for its supervisory authority, Professor Sara Sun Beale 
argues that the justification likely rests with the implied or ancillary 
powers of the courts.100 She analogizes these powers to the implied or 
ancillary powers of the executive, noting that 
the textual differences between articles II and III suggest, if 
anything, that the argument for a generous interpretation of the 
judiciary’s implied powers is stronger than the President’s claim 
under article II. The narrow Madisonian view of the President’s 
powers can readily be implied from the enumeration of detailed 
powers in article II. No similar enumeration of judicial powers is 
found in article III . . . .101 
Beale would not call this power an “inherent” power because it can 
be abrogated by congressional statute.102 The Supreme Court, 
however, has invoked the term “inherent” to describe this power.103 
Several Supreme Court Justices have explicitly questioned what 
appears to be a growing exercise of supervisory authority. In Frazier, 
a case involving district court rules of admission to the bar, then-
Justice Rehnquist called the reliance on supervisory authority 
“newfound and quite unwarranted.”104 In another case reviewing a 
lower court’s exercise of supervisory authority to dismiss an 
 
 99. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
 100. Sara Sun Beale, Reconsidering Supervisory Power in Criminal Cases: Constitutional and 
Statutory Limits on the Authority of the Federal Courts, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1433, 1471–72 
(1984). 
 101. Id. (footnote omitted). 
 102. Id. at 1467–68. 
 103. See Frazier v. Heebe, 482 U.S. 641, 645 (1986) (“This Court may exercise its inherent 
supervisory power to ensure that these local rules are consistent with ‘the principles of right and 
justice.’” (quoting In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 554 (1968) (White, J., concurring)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
 104. Id. at 655 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
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indictment for misconduct, Justice Scalia stated that he did not “see 
the basis for any direct authority to supervise lower courts.”105 
Relatedly, some scholars have challenged the prudence and 
constitutionality of supervisory authority. Professor Beale concludes 
that “supervisory authority,” as invoked by the Supreme Court, 
actually refers to a number of different forms of authority, not all of 
which are within the Court’s constitutional competence.106 When the 
Court acts without statutory authority, Beale argues that it should 
exercise its supervisory authority narrowly, establishing rules only for 
“matters relating to the efficiency and reliability of the judicial 
process.”107 Professor Amy Coney Barrett has also explored the 
constitutional basis for supervisory authority, ultimately concluding 
that it is in “significant tension” with the structure of Article III.108 She 
notes that even if one could reasonably conclude that the supreme-
inferior distinction called for a judicial hierarchy, and that the word 
“supreme” conveyed inherent authority,109 one must also find that this 
inherent authority extended to the control of inferior court 
procedure.110 Barrett argues that the ambiguity of the text, combined 
with a sparse historical record, weighs heavily against supervisory 
authority’s claim to constitutional legitimacy.111 
Though he does not specifically address the supervisory-power 
doctrine, Professor David Engdahl also challenges its underpinnings 
by arguing that the constitutional text does not mandate the current 
judicial hierarchy.112 Relying heavily on the history of state judiciaries 
and the ratification compromise, Engdahl argues that the supreme-
inferior distinction implies no hierarchy at all, requiring only that the 
Supreme Court have the widest geographic and subject-matter 
jurisdiction.113 In his view, the “supreme Court” could theoretically be 
reviewed by “inferior Courts” and still meet its constitutional 
 
 105. Bank of N.S. v. United States, 487 U.S. 250, 264 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 106. Beale, supra note 100, at 1520. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Amy Coney Barrett, The Supervisory Power of the Supreme Court, 106 COLUM. L. 
REV. 324, 364 (2006). 
 109. This claim is dubious, according to Professor Barrett, who sees the distinction between 
“supreme” and “inferior” courts as a limit on congressional establishment of further courts 
rather than as a grant of special supervisory power to the Supreme Court. Id. at 387. 
 110. Id. at 365. 
 111. Id. at 371. 
 112. David E. Engdahl, What’s in a Name? The Constitutionality of Multiple “Supreme” 
Courts, 66 IND. L.J. 457, 491 (1991). 
 113. Id. at 467–68. 
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requirements.114 If accepted, this argument would effectively erode the 
hierarchical justification for supervisory authority. Despite the 
existence of scholarship challenging the supervisory-power doctrine, 
the Court continues to rely upon it when promulgating procedural 
rules for the lower federal courts. 
3. Equitable Powers.  The third major category of inherent or 
implied Article III powers is equitable power. As the Supreme Court 
has defined it, “The essence of a court’s equity power lies in its 
inherent capacity to adjust remedies in a feasible and practical way to 
eliminate the conditions or redress the injuries caused by the unlawful 
action.”115 Several good arguments exist, however, for rejecting the 
categorization of equitable powers as “inherent.” First, the judiciary’s 
equitable powers are explicitly authorized by the text of the 
Constitution. Article III, Section 2 declares that “[t]he judicial Power 
shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this 
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or 
which shall be made, under their Authority.”116 Second, equitable 
powers are not per se necessary to the resolution of a great many 
cases. Nevertheless, federal courts have cited “inherent” equitable 
powers to justify a number of procedural and remedial decisions.117 
The justification for inherent equitable powers is grounded in the 
English tradition of equity courts. Rather than establish separate 
courts of law and equity under Article III, the Framers adopted a 
unified approach in which all federal courts could sit in either law or 
 
 114. See id. at 468–72 (noting that Virginia, Delaware, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, 
North Carolina, and Georgia lacked pyramid-style judicial systems at the time of ratification). 
 115. Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 487 (1992). 
 116. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (emphasis added). 
 117. See, e.g., Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 4–5 (1972) (“Although the traditional American rule 
ordinarily disfavors the allowance of attorneys’ fees in the absence of statutory or contractual 
authorization, federal courts, in the exercise of their equitable powers, may award attorneys’ 
fees when the interests of justice so require. Indeed, the power to award such fees ‘is part of the 
original authority of the chancellor to do equity in a particular situation,’ and federal courts do 
not hesitate to exercise this inherent equitable power . . . .” (footnotes omitted) (citation 
omitted) (quoting Sprague v. Ticonic Nat’l Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 166 (1939))); Inland Steel Co. v. 
United States, 306 U.S. 153, 156 (1938) (“A court of equity ‘in the exercise of its discretion, 
frequently resorts to the expedient of imposing terms and conditions upon the party at whose 
instance it proposes to act. The power to impose such conditions is founded upon, and arises 
from, the discretion which the court has in such cases, to grant, or not to grant, the injunction 
applied for. It is a power inherent in the court, as a court of equity, and has been exercised from 
time immemorial.’” (quoting Russell v. Farley, 105 U.S. 433, 438 (1881))); Calloway v. Dobson, 
4 F. Cas. 1082, 1083 (Marshall, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 2325) (citing the circuit 
court’s equitable power to permit parties to amend pleadings). 
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equity.118 This choice effectively imported some English notions of 
equitable powers into the American judicial system. The Supreme 
Court explicitly recognized this fact in Atlas Life Insurance Co. v. W.I. 
Southern, Inc.119: 
The “jurisdiction” thus conferred on the federal courts to entertain 
suits in equity is an authority to administer in equity suits the 
principles of the system of judicial remedies which had been devised 
and was being administered by the English Court of Chancery at the 
time of the separation of the two countries.120 
These equitable powers became universally available—and thus more 
pervasive—when the systems of law and equity were merged in 
1938.121 But jurists disagree over the extent to which equitable 
principles have continued to develop in American history or remain 
as frozen-in-time testaments to the English system circa 1783.122 For 
this Note’s purposes, it is sufficient to note that equitable judicial 
powers enjoy a long and respected history within the judiciary. 
Given this well-established relationship between judges and 
equity, it is perhaps unsurprising that the Supreme Court has been 
extremely reluctant to find its equitable powers constrained. 
Professor William Eskridge notes that the Supreme Court, when 
engaging in statutory interpretation, “may . . . presume that Congress 
does not intend to strip federal courts of their inherent powers, 
especially their power to fashion creative relief in equity.”123 The 
Court has also repeatedly affirmed the breadth of its powers to 
fashion equitable remedies.124 In the course of jealously guarding its 
equitable powers, the Court has made a powerful statement of its 
 
 118. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (“The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and 
Equity . . . .”). 
 119. Atlas Life Ins. Co. v. W.I.S., Inc., 306 U.S. 563 (1938). 
 120. Id. at 568. 
 121. See Rhonda Wasserman, Equity Transformed: Preliminary Injunctions To Require the 
Payment of Money, 70 B.U. L. REV. 623, 653–54 (1990) (“Like their English counterparts, early 
American courts refrained from granting equitable remedies if adequate remedies at law 
existed. When law and equity were merged into a unitary system in 1938, the historical reason 
for judicial restraint in granting equitable relief disappeared: two competing judicial systems no 
longer existed.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 122. Richard H.W. Maloy, Expansive Equity Jurisprudence: A Court Divided, 40 SUFFOLK 
U. L. REV. 641, 642 (2007). 
 123. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 
1007, 1023 (1989) (omission in original). 
 124. John Choon Yoo, Who Measures the Chancellor’s Foot? The Inherent Remedial 
Authority of the Federal Courts, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1121, 1132 (1996). 
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resistance to infringements on authority it views as inherent to its 
office. 
II.  THE FRAMERS’ VISION OF INDEPENDENT JUDGES ENGAGED IN 
INTERPRETATION 
Inherent judicial powers have been defined in an ad hoc manner, 
elaborated whenever such powers prove necessary to protect a 
judge’s role in the system. Despite the growing push for control over 
methodology, courts have not had occasion to consider whether a 
judge’s methodological choices might be considered an inherent 
power and, if so, the extent to which they can be abrogated. This Part 
begins to answer this question by considering the Framers’ vision of 
the function of federal judges. First, I argue that the Framers sought 
to insulate federal judges from outside pressure that could affect the 
independent adjudication of cases and controversies. Second, I 
describe the expectation of the Framers that these judges would 
engage in constitutional and statutory interpretation. 
A. Federal Judges as Independent Arbiters 
The text of the Constitution establishes important protections for 
the independence of judges. Article III, Section 1 provides, “The 
Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their 
Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for 
their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during 
their Continuance in Office.”125 These provisions ensure both financial 
and job security for federal judges. They were aimed at combating the 
undue influence of the executive and legislative branches on federal 
judges. 
Although the Framers agreed on the major proposals,126 they 
disagreed over the possibility of locking salaries at the level of 
appointment. The initial draft of the Constitution took this tack, but 
Gouverneur Morris submitted a proposal to strike that provision to 
allow salaries to increase with the changing circumstances of the 
nation.127 James Madison dissented, suggesting that this proposal 
 
 125. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
 126. See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 38 (Max Farrand ed., 
2d. ed. 1937) (noting that the amendments to permit judges to serve in “good Behaviour” and 
with a fixed salary passed unanimously). 
 127. Id. at 44. 
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made judges dependent upon the legislature.128 He preferred to tie 
judicial salaries to a specific standard such as the price of wheat to 
remove even the possibility of legislative control.129 The Framers 
shared Madison’s concern regarding the independence of the new 
federal judges, but they were worried that tying judicial salaries to the 
price of wheat might actually backfire as the country changed.130 
Although Madison lost the battle to tie salaries to a fixed standard,131 
the exchange nevertheless reveals the Framers’ efforts to craft 
constitutional provisions that would insulate judges from undue 
influence over their work.132 
Many of the Framers were trained in the law,133 so unsurprisingly, 
the Constitution’s protections of judicial independence reflect 
broader legal opinions of the time. Timothy Cunningham’s 1771 law 
dictionary shared the following anecdote: 
The judge at his creation takes an oath that he shall indifferently 
minister justice to all them that shall have any fruit or plea before 
him, and this he shall not forbear to do, though the King by his 
letters, or by express word of mouth, should command the 
contrary . . . . King Henry the Fourth, when his eldest son the Prince 
was by the Lord Chief Justice, for some great misdemeanors, 
committed to prison, thanked God that he had a son of that 
 
 128. Id. at 45. 
 129. Id. 
 130. See id. (recording Morris’s reply that there should be flexibility to increase judges’ 
salaries as their workload grew and society changed, a flexibility that could not be achieved by a 
salary tied to the price of wheat). 
 131. Id. On the motion for striking the words “or increase” from the drafted salary 
protections, there were six “[a]yes,” two “noes,” and one abstention. Id. 
 132. For further historical analysis and support on this point, see generally James S. 
Liebman & William F. Ryan, “Some Effectual Power”: The Quantity and Quality of 
Decisionmaking Required of Article III Courts, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 696 (1998); and Jack N. 
Rakove, The Original Justifications for Judicial Independence, 95 GEO. L.J. 1061 (2007). For a 
textual analysis of the independence protections, see generally Martin H. Redish, Judicial 
Discipline, Judicial Independence, and the Constitution: A Textual and Structural Analysis, 72 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 673 (1999). 
 133. Thirty-five of the fifty-five delegates to the Constitutional Convention were lawyers, 
though not all of them practiced law as their main occupation. Some of the Framers were even 
judges themselves. The Founding Fathers: A Brief Overview, NAT’L ARCHIVES, http://www.
archives.gov/exhibits/charters/constitution_founding_fathers_overview.html (last visited Nov. 9, 
2011). 
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obedience, and a judge so impartial, and of such undaunted 
courage . . . .134 
This commentary emphasizes the importance of a judge’s 
independent decisionmaking, especially in the face of external 
pressures. Giles Jacob’s English law dictionary—published in London 
in 1729 and in America in 1811—similarly describes an independent 
judiciary with tenure in good behavior, salary protections, and 
insulation from injury or punishment.135 These dictionaries 
demonstrate a growing consensus that the independence of judges 
was a critical feature of a working judiciary. 
During the ratification period, Alexander Hamilton touted the 
benefits of these judicial protections. In Federalist No. 78, Hamilton 
wrote, 
The standard of good behavior for the continuance in office of the 
judicial magistracy, is certainly one of the most valuable of the 
modern improvements in the practice of government. . . . And it is 
the best expedient which can be devised in any government, to 
secure a steady, upright, and impartial administration of the laws.136 
Hamilton’s words appear to echo a consensus at the Constitutional 
Convention and among the broader legal community at the time that 
judges should have sufficient insulation from the other branches of 
government. 
B. Federal Judges as Interpreters of Federal Law 
Although the Framers were explicit about judicial protections, 
they did not clearly outline the duties of a federal judge. The closest 
analogue to the enumeration of powers and duties of Congress in 
Article I is the jurisdictional grant of Article III, Section 2.137 This 
provision defines only the scope of judicial power, however, not the 
functions of federal judges. Despite this lack of textual instruction, 
the Constitution’s drafting records and ratification history provide 
strong support for the conclusion that the Framers expected the 
 
 134. 2 T. CUNNINGHAM, A NEW AND COMPLETE LAW-DICTIONARY, at JUB JUD 
(London, His Majesty’s Law Printers 2d ed. 1771). 
 135. 2 GILES JACOB, THE LAW-DICTIONARY: EXPLAINING THE RISE, PROGRESS, AND 
PRESENT STATE, OF THE ENGLISH LAW, IN THEORY AND PRACTICE, at ISSUE. JUDGES. – 
JUDGES. JUDGMENT. (T.E. Tomlins ed., London, His Majesty’s Law Printers 1797). 
 136. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 392 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009). 
 137. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (outlining nine jurisdictional grants for the federal 
judiciary). 
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federal judiciary to engage in constitutional and statutory 
interpretation.138 
The records of the Constitutional Convention reveal repeated 
invocations of the judiciary’s power to interpret. When debating the 
potential for a “Council of Revision” made up of the executive and 
judiciary to “overrule” legislative acts, Elbridge Gerry noted that the 
judiciary did not need to be a part of such a council.139 According to 
Madison’s notes from June 4, 1787, Gerry asserted that the judiciary 
“[would] have a sufficient check [against] encroachments on their 
own department by their exposition of the laws, which involved a 
power of deciding on their Constitutionality. In some States the 
Judges had actually set aside laws as being [against] the Constitution. 
This was done too with general approbation.”140 Similar comments 
were made in later discussions on the subject throughout the 
summer.141 
While discussing the Council of Revision, the Framers repeatedly 
raised two objections to judicial participation that reflect a 
widespread assumption that judges would engage in statutory 
interpretation. First, the council’s opponents contended that the 
judiciary did not need to participate in the proposed legislative 
“negative” because they could declare laws unconstitutional later.142 
Second, they maintained that participation in such a council would 
bias the judges in their later adjudicatory duties.143 The thrust of these 
arguments was that the judiciary’s evaluation of legislation would 
take place at a later time. Once the judiciary’s position in the Council 
 
 138. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 136, at 394. 
 139. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 126, at 97–98. 
 140. Id. at 97 (emphasis omitted). 
 141. See id. at 108–09 (recording John Dickinson’s commentary that “[t]here is a 
Difference—the Judges must interpret the Laws[;] they ought not to be legislators”); id. at 109 
(“Mr. King was of opinion that the Judicial ought not to join in the negative of a Law, because 
the Judges will have the expounding of those Laws when they come before them; and they will 
no doubt stop the operation of such as shall appear repugnant to the constitution.”); 2 id. at 73–
80 (summarizing further objections raised to having the expositor of laws participate in a 
Council of Revision). 
 142. See, e.g., 2 id. at 76 (“And as to the Constitutionality of laws, that point will come 
before the Judges in their proper official character. In this character they have a negative on the 
laws. Join them with the Executive in the Revision and they will have a double negative.”). 
 143. See, e.g., id. at 75 (“Mr. Strong thought with Mr. Gerry that the power of making ought 
to be kept distinct from that of expounding, the laws. No maxim was better established. The 
Judges in exercising the function of expositors might be influenced by the part they had taken, 
in framing the laws.”). 
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of Revision failed,144 the president’s veto took the place of a Council 
of Revision as a way to disapprove congressional action.145 
Ratification history also supports the conclusion that those 
ratifying the Constitution were aware that the judiciary was expected 
to engage in both constitutional and statutory interpretation. Writing 
as Publius in The Federalist Papers, Hamilton said, “The 
interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar province of the 
courts. A constitution is . . . a fundamental law. It therefore belongs to 
[judges] to ascertain its meaning, as well as the meaning of any 
particular act proceeding from the legislative body.”146 Similarly, 
James Wilson, one of Pennsylvania’s delegates to the Constitutional 
Convention, told his home state’s ratification convention: 
[I]t is possible that the legislature . . . may transgress the bounds 
assigned to it, and an act may pass, in the usual mode, 
notwithstanding that transgression; but when it comes to be 
discussed before the judges,—when they consider its principles, and 
find it to be incompatible with the superior power of the 
Constitution,—it is their duty to pronounce it void; and judges 
independent, and not obliged to look to every session for a 
continuance of their salaries, will behave with intrepidity, and refuse 
to the act the sanction of judicial authority.147 
Such statements were made to the public and to the legislators who 
would vote on a state’s ratification of the proposed Constitution. 
Thus, those voting on the Constitution were unlikely to be in doubt 
about the intentions of the Framers on the matter of judicial 
interpretation of the laws. 
The critique of this position generally centered on the lack of 
textual support for the power, rather than on concerns about the 
judiciary’s exercise of the power. In the Virginia ratification debates, 
Patrick Henry lauded Virginia’s judges for standing against the 
unconstitutional acts of the state legislature, but he expressed concern 
that the Constitution lacked a textual landmark for the exercise of 
 
 144. Id. at 80 (recording the failure of the motion, with three “[a]yes,” four “noes,” and two 
states divided). 
 145. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 (requiring a presidential signature for a bill to become 
law, or a two-thirds vote of both houses of Congress to override a presidential veto). 
 146. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 136, at 394. 
 147. 2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, ON THE ADOPTION OF THE 
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 446 (photo. reprint 1996) (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1891). 
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this power at the federal level.148 He asked rhetorically if Madison was 
sure that the judiciary would stand against the legislature, without any 
explicit authority to do so.149 Despite some legislators’ unease with the 
lack of textual support, the ratification debates reveal repeated 
assertions by the pro-Constitution drafters that constitutional and 
statutory interpretation would indeed be a task for the judiciary. 
Under these circumstances, it might seem surprising that there is 
no evidence that the Framers discussed which tools would be 
appropriate for judges engaging in interpretation. After all, the task 
asks judges to make subjective judgments about what evidence is 
relevant and what persuasive value one should attach to it. This 
approach was not a unique concept in law, as the English common-
law system relied on a similar process for statutory interpretation.150 
The Framers did not, however, define parameters or rules for the 
interpretation of the Constitution and federal statutes. The 
conspicuous absence of any debate on the subject suggests the 
Framers assumed that judges would continue to use the same tools 
and procedures traditionally invoked under English law in such 
cases.151 
III.  ARTICLE III JUDICIAL POWER AS A SOURCE OF AUTHORITY 
OVER METHODOLOGY 
The preceding Part described the Framers’ vision for Article III 
judges as independent arbiters ready to stand against the more 
dangerous political branches on questions of interpretation. The next 
step is to consider this vision’s compatibility with constraints on 
judicial methodology. This Part argues that courts cannot 
 
 148. 3 id. at 325. 
 149. Id. 
 150. See 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *430–32 (“But there is not a single rule 
of interpreting laws, whether equitably or strictly, that is not equally used by the judges in the 
courts, both of law and equity : the construction must in both be the same : or, if they differ, it is 
only as one court of law may also happen to differ from another. Each endeavours to fix and 
adopt the true sense of the law in question . . . .”). 
 151. Professor William Eskridge Jr. has conducted a lengthy historical analysis of Founding-
era understandings of interpretive tools. William N. Eskridge, Jr., All About Words: Early 
Understandings of the “Judicial Power” in Statutory Interpretation, 1776–1806, 101 COLUM. L. 
REV. 990 (2001). He writes that the Framers were at least familiar with, and understood the 
importance of, the canons of statutory construction. Id. at 1099–1100. This conclusion lends 
further support to my argument that the Framers would have expected judges to proceed as 
judges had always done, with substantial freedom to employ the varied tools of statutory 
construction. 
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meaningfully implement the structure established by the Framers if 
judges are constrained in their methodological choices.152 This thesis 
encompasses two arguments. First, methods of interpretation are 
intimately connected to the deliberation that is essential to judging. 
Second, judicial independence from the other branches cannot 
tolerate a binding methodological framework. Because a reasonable 
zone of freedom is necessary to the fulfillment of the constitutionally 
established judicial role, this freedom must be considered an inherent 
power of all federal judges. 
A. Interpretive Deliberation as an Essential Judicial Function 
Interpretation of the laws is one of the judiciary’s most important 
constitutional duties. Although all governmental actors may, and 
should, consider the constitutionality of the tasks they undertake, the 
judiciary has always served as the final interpreter. The supporters of 
the Constitution argued during the ratification debates153 that it was 
appropriate for Article III judges to assume this role, and judges have 
steadily maintained this function ever since. Perhaps the most famous 
defense of this power came in Hamilton’s Federalist No. 78. After 
assuring the public that the judiciary would always be the least 
dangerous branch,154 Hamilton proceeded to argue that judicial review 
was necessary not only to ensure the constitutionality of the laws but 
also to check those who would make mischief.155 The subsequent 
history is well known: the Constitution was ratified and, fifteen years 
later, Chief Justice Marshall took up the mantle of judicial review in 
Marbury. In order to engage in this essential judicial task, judges must 
adopt some method of interpretation. This Section demonstrates the 
ways in which interpretive methodology is distinct from procedural 
rules and substantive laws but is intimately connected to the heart of 
the judicial interpretive function. 
 
 152. I do not suggest that a judge experiences no constraint on his choices. The “good 
Behaviour” shield could easily become a sword to be used against a judge whose methodology 
defies legal conventions or craft. 
 153. See supra Part II.B. 
 154. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 136, at 392. 
 155. Id. at 396 (“[T]he firmness of the judicial magistracy . . . . not only serves to moderate 
the immediate mischiefs of those which may have been passed, but it operates as a check upon 
the legislative body in passing them; who, perceiving that obstacles to the success of iniquitous 
intention are to be expected from the scruples of the courts, are in a manner compelled, by the 
very motives of the injustice they meditate, to qualify their attempts.”). 
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Interpretation is best conceptualized as a matter of judicial 
“craft.”156 Immanuel Kant’s theory understands judgment as “learned 
but not defined.”157 Perhaps it is unsurprising, then, that so many 
judges have compared their role to that of the artist.158 The 
interpretive task involves aggregating, processing, and prioritizing 
information, but it also involves a great deal of judgment.159 As then-
Professor—later Second Circuit judge—Jerome Frank explains, “The 
law is not a machine and the judges not machine-tenders.”160 Rather, 
judges must bring to bear their experience, their thoughtfulness, and 
even their instincts.161 Evaluating judgment in the context of business 
lawyering, Professor Jeffrey Lipshaw notes that judgment is an 
exercise of the mind that is mysterious precisely because it is neither 
 
 156. See Gluck, supra note 7, at 1849 (dismissing objections to methodological frameworks 
based on arguments of judicial “craft” as susceptible to the rejoinder that all law is craft). 
 157. Jeffrey M. Lipshaw, The Venn Diagram of Business Lawyering Judgments, 41 SETON 
HALL L. REV. 1, 3 (2011) (citing IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON 268–69 (Paul 
Guyer & Allen Wood trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1999) (1787)). 
 158. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 63 (2008) (“Norms govern the 
various art genres, just as norms govern judicial decisions—and in both cases the norms are 
contestable. Manet could not paint as well, in the conventional sense, as his teacher, Couture; 
but in the fullness of time Manet became regarded as much the greater painter. Holmes, 
Brandeis, Cardozo, and Hand are examples of judges who succeeded by their example in 
altering the norms of opinion writing.”); Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of 
Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527, 530 (1947) (“When one wants to understand or at least get the 
feeling of great painting, one does not go to books on the art of painting. One goes to the great 
masters. And so I have gone to great masters to get a sense of their practise of the art of 
interpretation. However, the art of painting and the art of interpretation are very different 
arts.”). 
 159. Then-Professor Easterbrook suggests that judges should be more willing to admit that 
there is no answer—that a given statute cannot be construed to answer the same question, thus 
returning the problem back to the legislature. Frank H. Easterbrook, Legal Interpretation and 
the Power of the Judiciary, 7 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 87, 99 (1984). Easterbrook says that 
interpretation of words is hard even with years to study a document written by a single person, 
but that the challenges are only magnified by the legislative process. Id. at 87–88. According to 
Easterbrook, judges should refuse to offer an interpretation unless the statute clearly transfers 
authority to the courts to make common law on the issue. Id. at 92–94. 
 160. JEROME N. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 120 (1930). 
 161. See, e.g., Joseph C. Hutcheson, Jr., The Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the 
“Hunch” in Judicial Decision, 14 CORNELL L.Q. 274, 278 (1929) (“I, after canvassing all the 
available material at my command, and duly cogitating upon it, give my imagination play, and 
brooding over the cause, wait for the feeling, the hunch—that intuitive flash of understanding 
which makes the jump-spark connection between question and decision, and at the point where 
the path is darkest for the judicial feet, sheds its light along the way.”). Hutcheson Jr. served as a 
federal district judge for the Southern District of Texas from 1918 to 1931, when he became a 
Fifth Circuit judge—a position he held until his death in 1973. Biographical Directory of Federal 
Judges: Hutcheson, Joseph Chappell Jr., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/nGet
Info?jid=1136&cid=999&ctype=na&instate=na (last visited Nov. 9, 2011). 
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algorithmic nor random.162 Over time, a judge will gain a wealth of 
experience to assist in this endeavor. He may also develop a 
philosophy about the type of evidence that most accurately reflects a 
judge’s role in the system.163 
The mechanism of applying a methodology may look procedural, 
but the philosophical considerations entwined with the procedural 
aspects make that label an ill fit. A judge’s philosophy of 
interpretation is inextricably connected to his processing of 
information and his determination of its persuasiveness. Justice Scalia 
privileges text, history, and precedent when interpreting law because 
he views himself as lacking the authority to look beyond those tools.164 
Similarly, Justice Breyer looks to purposes, consequences, and other 
tools less bound to text because he believes that the Constitution’s 
democratic imperative mandates his doing so.165 Other judges have 
similarly tied their methods of interpretation to broader ideas about 
the role of judges in the system.166 
 
 162. Lipshaw, supra note 157, at 12–14. 
 163. For an interesting theoretical article about how rational judges select their interpretive 
methods, see Alexander Volokh, Choosing Interpretive Methods, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 769 (2008). 
Professor Volokh suggests that interpretive methods are only constraining to the extent that 
judges must stay within the bounds of plausibility. Id. at 795. 
 164. See SCALIA, supra note 13, at 23 (“To be a textualist in good standing, one need not be 
too dull to perceive the broader social purposes that a statute is designed, or could be designed, 
to serve; or too hidebound to realize that new times require new laws. One need only hold the 
belief that judges have no authority to pursue those broader purposes or write those new 
laws.”). 
 165. See BREYER, supra note 13, at 6 (“But my thesis reaches beyond these classic 
arguments. It finds in the Constitution’s democratic objective not simply restraint on judicial 
power or an ancient counterpart of more modern protection, but also a source of judicial 
authority and an interpretive aid to more effective protection of ancient and modern liberty 
alike.”). 
 166. See, e.g., Frankfurter, supra note 158, at 533–34 (“[Judges] are confined by the nature 
and scope of the judicial function in its particular exercise in the field of 
interpretation. . . . There are varying shades of compulsion for judges behind different words, 
differences that are due to the words themselves, their setting in a text, their setting in history. 
In short, judges are not unfettered glossators.”); Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation—In 
the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 817 (1983) (“The judge who 
recognizes the degree to which he is free rather than constrained in the interpretation of 
statutes, and who refuses to make a pretense of constraint by parading the canons of 
construction in his opinions, is less likely to act wilfully than the judge who either mistakes 
freedom for constraint or has no compunctions about misrepresenting his will as that of the 
Congress.”); see also Albert M. Sacks, Felix Frankfurter, in 3 THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED 
STATES SUPREME COURT 1199, 1200 (Leon Friedman & Fred L. Israel eds., 1997) (“The nature 
of the issues which are involved in the legal controversies that are inevitable under our 
constitutional system does not warrant the nation to expect identity of views among the 
members of the Court regarding such issues, nor even agreement on the routes of thought by 
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To order a judge to consider—or not to consider—particular 
types of evidence is to mandate a philosophy of interpretation. Doing 
so would make it impossible for some judges to fulfill their oath to 
uphold the Constitution.167 Textualists like Justice Scalia, if forced to 
focus on purposes and consequences, would believe that they were 
exceeding their constitutional authority.168 Purposivists like Justice 
Breyer, if forced to abandon their traditional tools, would feel that 
they were ignoring their constitutional mandate to interpret laws to 
fulfill congressional purpose.169 Considered in this light, methodology 
is best viewed not as a procedural rule but rather as a theoretical 
approach that cannot and should not be reduced to a codified 
“Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation.”170 
Some critics might argue that methodological constraints would 
not produce a constitutional dilemma because all of the proffered 
approaches to statutory construction are constitutional. Given that no 
one has attempted to impeach a Supreme Court Justice for looking or 
not looking at particular pieces of evidence, it seems likely that all of 
the major methods of interpretation are indeed constitutional. But 
the key here is not whether all of these methodologies are, in fact, 
legitimate, but whether the judge himself views his actions as 
legitimate. If not, the judge cannot be considered to have upheld his 
oath. Oaths are individual affirmations, relying upon one’s conscience 
and personal judgment, in addition to one’s awareness of the broader 
societal consensus on a matter. Even if a judge could not be 
impeached for violating his personal view of the Constitution—as 
opposed to the public view—one might expect outright defiance or 
 
which decisions are reached. The nation is merely warranted in expecting harmony of aims 
among those who have been called to the Court.” (emphasis added) (quoting Retirement of Mr. 
Justice Frankfurter, 371 U.S. vii, x (1962))). 
 167. See 28 U.S.C. § 453 (2006) (“I, _______ _______, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I 
will administer justice without respect to persons, and do equal right to the poor and to the rich, 
and that I will faithfully and impartially discharge and perform all the duties incumbent upon 
me as _______ under the Constitution and laws of the United States. So help me God.”). 
 168. See supra note 164 and accompanying text. 
 169. See supra note 165 and accompanying text. 
 170. But see Rosenkranz, supra note 47, at 2157 (“This Article endorses a Canons Enabling 
Act on the same model and a coherent set of canons to bring order to statutory interpretation, 
just as the Rules have brought order to procedure and to evidence. This set of canons may be 
written by the Supreme Court, but should be subject to searching inquiry and disapproval or 
amendment by Congress. The result of this joint effort—which at long last may render statutory 
interpretation consistent and predictable—should be called the Federal Rules of Statutory 
Interpretation.”). 
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resignations from those who felt uncomfortable with the mandated 
methodological framework. 
Methodology can be conceptualized in two alternative ways: one 
that treats methods as substantive rules of decision and one that 
treats methods as akin to the procedural rules already codified by 
Congress.171 Both have significant weaknesses, which I address in this 
Note to further highlight the benefits of thinking about methods of 
interpretation as part of the art of judging.172 
First, if federal judges’ methods of interpretation were mainly 
substantive in nature, they might be unconstitutional under Erie 
principles.173 Federal judges sit on courts of limited jurisdiction, with a 
mandate of restraint. Outside of a few specific areas, federal courts do 
not have the authority to create general common law.174 Suits brought 
pursuant to “arising under” jurisdiction generally ask judges to 
interpret and apply the federal laws that form the basis of the claim. 
The interpretive methodologies used to accomplish this task, 
however, are not equivalent to the substantive laws being interpreted. 
Judges have never treated interpretive methodology as substantive 
law. Although the Supreme Court has occasionally laid down a 
narrow test for discerning an Establishment Clause violation,175 a First 
Amendment violation,176 or the like, it has never called for stare 
 
 171. The question of how to conceptualize the discrete acts of judging is critical not only 
because it may determine the constraints put upon judging, but also because it affects the 
“attitude” of judging. See Charles M. Yablon, Justifying the Judge’s Hunch: An Essay on 
Discretion, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 231, 246 (1990) (“[C]alling a rule ‘procedural’ is a rhetorical 
strategy . . . to bring about changed attitudes on the part of judges.”). 
 172. See Frankfurter, supra note 166, at 530 (analogizing interpretation to an art that 
required his emulation of the “great masters”). 
 173. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78–79 (1937) (“There is no federal general 
common law . . . . [T]he doctrine of [Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842),] is, as Mr. Justice 
Holmes said, ‘an unconstitutional assumption of powers by courts of the United States which no 
lapse of time or respectable array of opinion should make us hesitate to correct.’” (quoting 
Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 
518, 533 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting))). 
 174. Id. at 78. 
 175. See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1970) (“First, the statute must have 
a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither 
advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster ‘an excessive government 
entanglement with religion.’” (citation omitted) (quoting Waltz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 
674 (1970))). 
 176. See, e.g., Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1918) (“The question in every case 
is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a 
clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a 
right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree.”). 
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decisis effect for interpretive methodologies.177 This traditional 
understanding of interpretive methodologies undermines any claim 
that methodologies are substantive lawmaking, even if they have an 
effect on the substantive outcome in a case. 
Despite the federal courts’ reluctance to treat interpretive rules 
as substantive “law” for the purposes of Erie, Professor Gluck argues 
that perhaps they should.178 At a minimum, she argues, Erie should be 
read to require Article III courts to apply state interpretive 
methodologies to state statutory questions.179 She notes, “The 
possibility that certain constitutional considerations might justify a 
federal court’s refusal to apply a specific state interpretive rule (or all 
of them) does not undermine the argument that, when not 
preempted, the baseline established by Erie is that federal courts will 
apply state legal principles in state-law cases.”180 Although Professor 
Gluck’s point is undoubtedly true, this Note argues that constitutional 
principles do preempt any application of state interpretive principles. 
If that constitutional argument is correct, then the potential 
application of Erie becomes irrelevant. 
It would be good practice for federal judges engaged in statutory 
interpretation to consider a state’s interpretive-methodological 
choices as embodied in a decision from the state’s highest court or an 
act from the state’s legislature. If a state has adopted a particular 
method of interpretation, then that methodological choice forms a 
background principle against which the state legislature acts. Such 
information is relevant to a judge’s task of statutory interpretation.181 
That a methodological choice is relevant, however, does not mean 
that one can constitutionally mandate Article III judges to follow it, 
if—as I suggest—methodology is an inherent power guaranteed by 
the Constitution. 
 
 177. Cf. Jordan Wilder Connors, Note, Treating Like Subdecisions Alike: The Scope of Stare 
Decisis as Applied to Judicial Methodology, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 681, 709 (2008) (“The Court 
would improve predictability in the same way that it enhances predictability in traditional 
applications of stare decisis by solidifying statutory interpretation subdecisions with stare 
decisis.”). 
 178. Abbe R. Gluck, Intersystemic Statutory Interpretation: Methodology as “Law” and the 
Erie Doctrine, 120 YALE L.J. 1898, 1997 (2011). 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. at 1959. 
 181. See, e.g., Meyer v. Holley, 537 U.S. 280, 285 (2003) (noting that Congress legislates 
against a background of legal principles and is assumed to incorporate those principles when it 
acts, an analysis that the Supreme Court would also likely apply in the context of state 
legislation). 
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Second, if one views interpretive methodologies as mere 
procedural mechanisms,182 then Congress must be able to abrogate 
these methodologies in favor of a legislatively endorsed framework. 
Professor Rosenkranz takes this position. He proposes the creation of 
“Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation” analogous to the codified 
Federal Rules of Evidence.183 Like canons of statutory interpretation, 
common-law evidence rules were developed by the federal courts to 
promote public policy in judicial resolution of cases—rules that were 
eventually codified, with some modifications, by Congress.184 
Although individual canons of statutory construction may resemble 
rules of evidence, a textualist or purposivist methodology as a whole 
does not. A methodology provides tools—in the form of canons of 
construction—to prioritize information, but it also relies heavily on 
judges to provide the discerning eye and judgment call. Importantly, 
it requires a broader vision of a judge’s role in the legal system than 
does the average Federal Rule of Evidence. Thus, the comparison is 
inapposite. 
If one accepts this Note’s view of interpretive freedom, it 
becomes evident that interpretation is part and parcel of this essential 
judicial function.185 As discussed in Part I, “Under the doctrine of 
inherent powers, the courts have the power, in addition to those 
powers expressly enumerated in constitutional and statutory 
provisions, to do all things reasonably necessary for the exercise of 
their functions as courts.”186 A key function of the federal courts is to 
serve as interpreters of ambiguous provisions in federal law.187 
Interpretive deliberation is a major part of the decisionmaking 
process of judges, a process that scholars and judges struggle to 
 
 182. Often, those who view methodologies as merely procedural find the judicial-craft view I 
advance to be overly romantic or naïve. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, 
Interpretation and Institutions, 101 MICH. L. REV. 885, 891 (2003) (“Our critique . . . is that the 
common law style of interpretation presupposes a fanciful, even romantic account of judicial 
capacities, and also fails to ask questions about likely legislative responses to different judicial 
approaches.”). 
 183. Rosenkranz, supra note 47, at 2107–08. 
 184. Id. 
 185. See Jellum, supra note 49, at 895–96 (“Assume that Congress enacted a general 
interpretive directive that required the rule of lenity to be ignored for all statutes in the penal 
code. Again, Congress is not trying to influence interpretation to further specific policy choices 
that it reached only after a deliberative process. Instead, Congress’s main motivation with such a 
statute is to control the interpretive process . . . .”). 
 186. 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law, supra note 78, § 305. 
 187. See supra Part II.A–B. 
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reduce to a formula.188 Efforts to rein in the methodological freedom 
of federal judges burden their exposition of the law. Though judges 
could conceivably follow a methodological framework established by 
someone else, to impose this kind of restriction would be to replace 
their role with the role of the very “machine-tenders” that they were 
not intended to be.189 
Although efforts to infringe on judges’ inherent powers are not 
per se unconstitutional,190 methodological choices are so intimately 
connected with judges’ thought processes that limits on them raise 
serious constitutional questions. In Michaelson v. United States,191 the 
Supreme Court held: “[T]he attributes which inhere in [the inherent 
judicial] power and are inseparable from it can neither be abrogated 
nor rendered practically inoperative. That it may be regulated within 
limits not precisely defined may not be doubted.”192 The Michaelson 
Court examined the inherent judicial power of contempt and 
ultimately upheld a regulation requiring jury trials for some cases of 
contempt.193 Contempt is more closely analogous to the power of 
interpretation than many of the other powers recognized as 
“inherent” to the judiciary because it involves a subjective 
determination made to further the judge’s exercise of his 
constitutional power. It is hard to imagine, however, that any of the 
proposals to restrict methodology would satisfy the Michaelson 
standard. The very act of interfering with a judge’s consideration of 
evidence strikes at the heart of the judicial power in a way that goes 
beyond a mere limitation. Interpretation cannot easily be regulated 
without essentially abrogating the freedom that is critical to the 
judge’s independent decisionmaking. 
 
 188. See Lipshaw, supra note 157, at 11–14 (“Nobody outside the mind of the being 
knows . . . what the basis of the judgment really is. . . . Something is going on in there, but we 
have no way of knowing precisely what it is.”). 
 189. See supra note 160 and accompanying text. 
 190. Evidence rules, for example, infringe on a judge’s ability to control the admission of 
evidence but are permissible to the extent that they merely supplement—rather than supplant—
judicial interpretations of the Constitution. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 437 
(2000) (“Congress retains the ultimate authority to modify or set aside any judicially created 
rules of evidence and procedure that are not required by the Constitution. But Congress may 
not legislatively supersede our decisions interpreting and applying the Constitution.” (citations 
omitted)). 
 191. Michaelson v. United States, 266 U.S. 42 (1924). 
 192. Id. at 66. 
 193. Id. at 70–71. 
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As this Section has shown, the task of constitutional 
interpretation is an essentially judicial task—an art of sorts. It 
requires judges to bring their experience and judgment to bear upon 
open questions of federal law. The methods of interpretation they use 
to decide the case are neither wholly procedural nor wholly 
substantive. They are best thought of as philosophical approaches to 
the art of interpretation. The Framers entrusted this task to judges, 
protecting judges’ ability to act without personal pressure from 
politicians in the other branches. Yet even more is in jeopardy than 
an individual judge’s power to fulfill his constitutional functions: 
methodological constraints threaten the ability of the judiciary as a 
whole to serve its constitutional role.194 As the next Section discusses, 
courts must guard those powers that are essential to their broader 
function as a member of a tripartite government.195 
B. Independent Interpretation as the Most Powerful Judicial Check 
The previous Section focused on the nature of the judicial 
function. This Section advances a companion argument: that 
proposed methodological constraints are a threat to judicial 
independence. This independence is important not only to maintain 
judicial integrity, but also to enable judges to serve their 
constitutional checking function. The strength of federal protections 
for judicial independence is fairly unique when compared to the 
protections for state judiciaries.196 As Part II.A described, the Framers 
were acutely aware of the problems caused by political influences on 
judges.197 Such influences could corrode the strength of the decisions 
themselves, in addition to affecting the judiciary’s ability to resist 
tyrannical whims of the political branches.198 Independence is thus the 
 
 194. Justice Breyer gave an address on the importance of judicial independence. He noted, 
  Constitutional guarantees of tenure and compensation may well help secure 
judicial independence, but they can by no means assure it. Ultimately independence is 
a matter of custom, habit, and institutional expectation. To build those customs, 
habits, and expectations requires time and support—not only from the bench and bar 
but from the community where the judges serve. 
Stephen Breyer, Judicial Independence, 95 GEO. L.J. 903, 904 (2007). 
 195. See 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law, supra note 78, § 305 (“The courts have, and should 
maintain vigorously, all the inherent and implied powers necessary properly and effectively to 
function as a separate department of government.”). 
 196. See Adam Liptak, Rendering Justice, with One Eye on Re-election, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 
2008, at A1 (reporting that “thirty-nine states elect at least some of their judges”). 
 197. See supra Part II.A. 
 198. See supra Part II.A. 
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hook on which the Framers decided to hang their judicial hat. Efforts 
to rein in interpretive freedom threaten this quality of the federal 
judiciary. 
The freedom to adopt a method of interpretation is necessary to 
the independent interpretation of the laws. As the last Section 
explained, methodologies are intimately connected to the 
decisionmaking process. Independence ensures that those 
methodologies are employed without external influence. This is 
particularly important in hard cases, when methodological choices 
will likely affect the outcome. Judges must be free to focus on 
adjudicating such cases within the constraints of their visions of the 
Constitution. Meddling with methodology would be just as 
detrimental to judicial integrity as the salary-based threats that 
preoccupied the Framers. 
The scholarship on judicial independence demonstrates 
overwhelming support for this concept, though much of it focuses on 
more obvious threats to the judiciary.199 Interpretation may not be the 
 
 199. See, e.g., David J. Beck, Judicial Independence: Woe to the Generation That Judges the 
Judges, 71 TEX. B.J. 572, 575 (2008) (“To preserve the integrity of our independent judiciary, we 
must ensure that they are given the tools to do their job. We owe it to our judiciary and the 
many men and women who have made a financial sacrifice to serve, to preserve for future 
generations a system in which judges decide cases free of bias or intimidation.”); Stephen B. 
Burbank, Judicial Independence, Judicial Accountability, and Interbranch Relations, 95 GEO. 
L.J. 909, 927 (2007) (“For, if judges forget that their independence exists for the benefit of the 
judiciary as a whole—and ultimately, of course, for the benefit of our system of government—
they may discover that, in the world of power politics, the reality of judicial independence does 
not match the rhetoric.”); Vicki C. Jackson, Packages of Judicial Independence: The Selection 
and Tenure of Article III Judges, 95 GEO. L.J. 965, 1007–08 (2007) (“The strong institutional 
independence of Article III judges anchors the legal infrastructure that accommodates elected 
judges in the state courts with the rule of law. This anchoring role of the Article III judiciary 
provides added reason why proposals to jettison central features of the traditional structure of 
federal judicial independence should be evaluated with great caution.”); Pamela S. Karlan, 
Judicial Independences, 95 GEO. L.J. 1041, 1059 (2007) (“Put more generally, judicial 
independence is not an end in itself; rather, it is a means of ensuring freedom and the rule of 
law. Thus, in explaining and arguing for ‘judicial independence,’ we need to ask quite carefully 
what constraints judges ought to be free from, and what constraints judges ought to be bound 
by.”); Irving R. Kaufman, The Essence of Judicial Independence, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 671, 700–
01 (1980) (“If we are to remain true to the Framers’ plan for a government bound at all levels by 
the rule of law, we must resist even well-intentioned legislation that would chill the capacity of 
the judge to render impartial justice. Judicial independence is not a cliché conjured up by those 
who seek to prevent encroachments by the other branches of government. The term is one of 
art, defined to achieve the essential objective of the separation of powers that justice be 
rendered without fear or bias, and free of prejudice.”). But see Paul D. Carrington & Roger C. 
Cramton, Judicial Independence in Excess: Reviving the Judicial Duty of the Supreme Court, 94 
CORNELL L. REV. 587, 589–90 (2009) (“It is unlikely that any judge ever sat on a law court 
enjoying more independence than the present Justices themselves have enjoyed. . . . [T]he 
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first subject one considers when attempting to cabin judicial power. In 
2009, District Court Judge Lee West gave an address about threats to 
judicial independence, focusing his remarks on threats in the form of 
a court-packing plan,200 efforts to overturn or denigrate judicial 
decisions in the public sphere,201 executive refusals to follow 
established law,202 and the politicization of the Department of 
Justice.203 But constraints on methodology are more insidious and 
equally pernicious threats to judicial independence. Methodologies 
can and do affect case outcomes,204 so a binding methodological 
framework would necessarily prevent judges from deciding cases as 
their philosophies and experiences might otherwise dictate. This 
phenomenon would fundamentally alter federal judges’ 
constitutionally created isolation, making them subordinate to the 
legislature or the fellow judges who created the framework. 
Although Part I identified inherent powers to include the full 
scope of implied or ancillary powers discussed in the literature, not all 
of these powers enjoy the same constitutional protection.205 Many 
powers deemed inherent by the courts create only the first-mover 
advantage, leaving another branch with the final say.206 Nevertheless, 
 
Justices have indulged their independence to make law that has seriously impaired the 
independence of the many judges sitting on state courts.”); William H. Pryor, Jr., Not-So-
Serious Threats to Judicial Independence, 93 VA. L. REV. 1759, 1762–63 (2007) (“I submit that 
the independence of the federal judiciary today is as secure as ever. The current criticisms of the 
judiciary are relatively mild and, on balance, a benefit to the judiciary.”). 
 200. Lee R. West, Speech, Judicial Independence: Our Fragile Fortress Against Elective 
Tyranny, 34 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 59, 62–63 (2009). 
 201. See id. at 63–65 (explaining how Congress attempted to bypass state court decisions 
regarding Terri Schiavo’s life). 
 202. See id. at 67 (“[I]n the landmark case of [Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006)], 
the Supreme Court held that the military commissions created by President Bush to try 
Guantanamo detainees failed to comply with the Uniform Code of Military Justice and the 
Geneva Conventions.” (footnote omitted)). 
 203. Id. at 72. 
 204. See Francisco J. Benzoni & Christopher S. Dodrill, Does Judicial Philosophy Matter? A 
Case Study, 113 W. VA. L. REV. 287, 330 (2011) (“The very structure of this 
study . . . . demonstrates that these judges were likely driven to their diverse conclusions at least 
in part because they adhere to diverse judicial philosophies.”). 
 205. See Beale, supra note 100, at 1472 (asserting that Congress has the final say over courts’ 
formulations of procedural rules through its power under the Necessary and Proper Clause, U.S. 
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8, and its Article III authority to establish the lower federal courts); id. at 
1472–73 (suggesting that the executive may also have a say in procedural rules to “preserve[] the 
essential functions of each branch” (quoting United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 707 (1974)) 
(internal quotation mark omitted)). 
 206. See id. at 1472 (“If the implied ancillary authority of the executive and the judiciary 
under articles II and III is given a generous interpretation, it will overlap with the legislative 
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some inherent powers may be so essential to the function of the 
judicial branch that neither Congress nor the executive can supersede 
them.207 Although rarely deciding these cases under the inherent-
power doctrine, the courts have repeatedly rejected legislative 
infringements on their essential function.208 The classic justification for 
these decisions is the maintenance of the separation of powers. 
For judicial review to serve as a check on the other branches, the 
judiciary must be able to act separately and independently.209 If 
Congress can dictate favorable outcomes in the courts through 
legislation, then the courts are no bulwark against the excesses of that 
branch, nor are they a deterrent. As Justice Jackson said 160 years 
after ratification, 
[W]hen a ruling majority has put its commands in statutory form, we 
have considered that the interpretation of their fair meaning and 
their application to individual cases should be made by judges as 
independent of politics as humanly possible and not serving the 
interests of the class for whom, or a majority by whom, legislation is 
enacted.210 
Though the lack of consensus in the federal system may have 
drawbacks,211 the erosion of the judiciary’s independence has greater 
 
authority under the necessary and proper clause. This does not pose a substantial problem, 
however. In the case of a conflict, the text of the necessary and proper clause reflects the 
expectation that Congress would enact laws to govern the other branches of government.”). 
 207. A law or executive action which substantially prevents the judiciary from performing its 
constitutional function will always be a threat to the separation of powers. 
 208. See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997) (“[The Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488, invalidated by City of 
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997)] was designed to control cases and controversies, such as 
the one before us; but as the provisions of the federal statute here invoked are beyond 
congressional authority, it is this Court’s precedent, not RFRA, which must control. . . . Broad 
as the power of Congress is under the Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
RFRA contradicts vital principles necessary to maintain separation of powers and the federal 
balance.”). 
 209. This point echoes Madison’s refrain at the Constitutional Convention: “If it be a 
fundamental principle of free Govt. that the Legislative, Executive & Judiciary powers should 
be separately exercised; it is equally so that they be independently exercised.” 2 THE RECORDS 
OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 126, at 56. 
 210. Robert J. Jackson, Problems of Statutory Interpretation, 8 F.R.D. 121, 123 (1949). 
 211. For an argument that the lack of consensus in the federal system is actually a positive 
attribute, see generally Ethan J. Leib & Michael Serota, The Costs of Consensus in Statutory 
Construction, 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE 47 (2010), http://yalelawjournal.org/2010/7/30/leib_serota
.html. That essay suggests that the tension among methodological philosophies promotes more 
deliberative decisionmaking and opinion writing, two practices that greatly benefit the law that 
emerges from American courts. Id. at 50. 
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costs. In common-law England, the judiciary was subservient to the 
king, who had delegated his power to its use. Under the U.S. system, 
however, the judiciary ought not to be subservient to either of its 
coequal branches. Thus, at a minimum, neither of the political 
branches should be able to impose a methodological framework on 
the judicial branch. The establishment of such frameworks by higher 
courts may burden the independence of particular judges—which of 
course is what the salary and life-tenure privileges protect—but it 
does not implicate the major concern of the Framers with preventing 
political influence. Rather, such intrabranch efforts to bind judges are 
inconsistent with the arguments advanced in the previous Section. 
C. Some Objections 
Several objections to my thesis can be raised. One criticism is 
that the very novelty of the argument may indicate its frailty. After 
all, Professor Gluck cites states that have had at least some success 
implementing binding methodological frameworks. Many of these 
states have constitutions with provisions analogous to those in the 
federal Constitution. Why should federal judges be different from 
state judges? To this question I have two responses. First, the 
struggles over the creation of these methodologies, and particularly 
over their legislative introduction in Texas and Connecticut, are 
consonant with my thesis. The state judges in those case studies made 
statements objecting to the infringement of their judicial power.212 
Second, the “success” stories all rested on the introduction of the 
methodology by the state supreme court, a path that may not be 
feasible in the federal system. The Madisonian Compromise left open 
the possibility that all Article III power would remain vested in the 
Supreme Court, but it also vested that power in those Article III 
courts yet to be created.213 Thus, Article III judges may have a 
different set of rights and responsibilities than the judges in Professor 
Gluck’s case studies, derived not only from the Constitution’s Vesting 
Clause,214 but also from the historical mandate described in Part II.B. 
Another criticism may be that if the vast majority of other 
inherent judicial powers can be constrained, then methodology 
 
 212. See supra notes 62–67 and accompanying text. 
 213. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested 
in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain 
and establish.”). 
 214. Id. 
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should also be subject to such restrictions. As this Note has shown, 
however, methodology is different. Although, at first blush, methods 
of interpretation might seem analogous to the Federal Rules of 
Evidence, their origins and context set them apart. Most methods of 
interpretation originate in a judge’s view of the proper role for 
federal judges in the constitutional scheme. They are necessary for 
one of the most important tasks that federal judges undertake—
providing the definitive statement of a law’s meaning. The intimate 
connection between judicial philosophy and interpretive outcomes 
suggests that interpretive methodology reaches to the very essence of 
what it means to be a federal judge. 
The Supreme Court has not had occasion to confront legislative 
abrogation of methodological freedom directly, but the issues raised 
by such abrogation bear many parallels to the issues addressed in the 
Court’s 1996 decision in City of Boerne v. Flores.215 In that case, 
Congress passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA)216 
aimed at essentially overruling the Supreme Court’s test for Free 
Exercise Clause violations.217 RFRA attempted to reintroduce the 
substantial-burden balancing test of Sherbert v. Verner.218 The Court 
rejected this effort as both beyond the scope of the Section Five 
enforcement power of the Fourteenth Amendment and a violation of 
the separation of powers.219 Although Congress could limit its own 
zone of action based upon a strict interpretation of the Free Exercise 
Clause—at least until some future Congress amended the Statute—it 
could not declare that interpretation to be constitutionally required 
and impose it upon state and local governments. If the Court rebuffed 
this more targeted attempt to infringe judicial deliberation, then it 
would likely also reject a broader attempt to impose a binding 
method of interpretation on the courts. 
CONCLUSION 
As the U.S. Code expands, the interpretive role of Article III 
judges only continues to grow in scope and importance. Though there 
may be rule-of-law benefits to greater methodological uniformity, 
 
 215. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1996). 
 216. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488, 
invalidated by Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
 217. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 512–13. 
 218. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
 219. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536. 
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those benefits cannot be pursued at the cost of the Constitution. As 
this Note has shown, the Framers included several constitutional 
provisions to insulate judges from the machinations of the other 
branches. They believed that judicial independence was important for 
the integrity of the system and focused on the two ways that a judge’s 
independence would most likely be infringed. But threatening a 
judge’s job or salary is not the only way to infringe his independence. 
One can also burden the judge’s ability to fulfill his role through 
methodological constraints. Such constraints threaten the ability of 
judges to independently arrive at a conclusion about what the words 
in a statute mean and about what Congress thought the statute would 
mean. In a very real sense, proposals that dictate a particular 
methodological framework strike at the heart of what the Framers 
intended federal judges to do. 
If fulfilling the constitutional vision of Article III judging 
requires some freedom of interpretation, then the next question is, 
How big is this zone of freedom? Is there no overlap of authority for 
Congress or the Supreme Court to create uniformity in the system? 
Though a full consideration of such authority is beyond the scope of 
this Note, the principles I advance suggest that neither of those bodies 
should be in the business of establishing a general framework of 
interpretation for federal judges. 
This Note thus puts in writing what has long been understood. 
One of the most fundamental tasks of federal judges is to bring their 
independent wisdom and judgment to bear in interpretation. The 
imposition of a rigid methodological framework is an interesting idea 
for academic scholarship, but it raises serious constitutional 
difficulties that should not be ignored for the sake of a theoretically 
appealing proposal. The essence of judging, at least on the federal 
level, requires freedom of interpretation. 
